ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION: A PARVENU INTRUDES ON ANCIENT LAW by unknown
ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION: A PARVENU INTRUDES ON
ANCIENT LAW
"It is a wise father that knows his own child."
--Merchant of Vcnice
WBN the lambent wit of science plays too carelessly with custom, the
lords of things-as-they-are have been known to respond with violence--or
latterly with more refined coercions. ' But even though active opposition
to maverick science has been substantially routed, few positive techniques
for social adjustment to accelerated change have yet been developed. 2
The problem persistently restates itself. It is a fugue on two recurrent
themes: one, the scientific solution of an urgent human need and the other
an earlier rationalization for that need. Attempts to apply the new technique
create frictions with the former apologia of custom and wont. The inter-
play of these phenomena explains the present travail of artificial insemina-
tion, one of the newer scientific developments of medicine.
While biologically dictated childlessness has long been recognized for its
1. Suppression of scientific advance has appeared in myriad forms and is successful
whenever it severs any link between the scientist and the beneficiaries of scientific research.
In the 17th Century methods were crass and struck directly at the scientist himself.
Giordani Bruno (imprisoned and burned at the stake, 1600) ; Galileo Gatili (imprisoned
under threat of torture; his papers sequestered, 1633).
In more modern times the scientist has been protected by his close association with
large and formally organized research institutions. This has not prevented the suppres-
sion of scientific discovery however. In fact it is one of the anomalies of American in-
dustry that it is as apt to suppress the products of its research as it is to foster their
marketing. For example, the patent grant which was conceived as a catalyst for dis-
covery in 1790 now frequently is made to serve as a bulwark against change and as a
prop for stultifying monopoly. CnoirTHE., TnE SocLw, RmvrzoNs oF ScmrucE c. 79
(1941); HAMILTON, PATENTS AND FRE ENTERPmRSE (TNEC Monograph 31, 1941).
Another form of suppression, if the scientist himself seems immune, is to attack the
organs which disseminate his discoveries. This may be accomplished by banning bo!s
or regulating the facilities and curricula of schools. KALLEN, Tim Brrumnz.D RussEL
CAsE (1940) ; Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S. W. 363 (1927).
Finally campaigns against change are frequently addressed to the very persons for
whose aid science had acted. Vaccination and birth control are cases in point. At present
ecclesiastical institutions are raising barriers against couples who would practice artificial
insemination. In 1948 a thirteen-member commission of the Church of England declared
artificial conception through extramarital donorship an "unlawful intrusion" and "breach
of marriage." Catholic authorities have taken a generally similar position. See Kelly,
The Morality of Artificial ITseminotion, 101 EcCa.SL*xSnicA REv. 109 (1939). While
the various Protestant churches and the Reformed Jewish Church have not yet crystalized
their views, it has been surmised that they vill probably tend to concur with whatever
state laws may be passed, but disapproval from the Orthodox Jewish synagogue is antic-
ipated, inasmuch as an orthodox Jewish marriage is only consunated at sexual inter-
course. See Abel, Present Status of Artlificial Inscmination, 85 SunuGmy, GYNEcOrhavw,
AND OBszwrscs 521 (International Abstract of Surgery) (1947).
2. For a concise statement of the problem see HuxL y, Ozz LIVING IN A REvoLuTion
vii-xiv (1942).
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frustrations and its dangers, I until recently, science had done no more than
ignore the challenge of sterility. 4 Within the last three decades, however,
a medical technique of artificial insemination has been developed which
can make childbearing possible in more than 35% of the 3,000,000 American
marriages now involuntarily barren. s
But after the scientist solved the physiological problem, and the doctor
began to relieve the patient, there arose the question of how to accommodate
the technique within the traditional legal rationalizations of marriage and
procreation. Although the law has not yet definitely spoken against arti-
ficial insemination, the mere uncertainty of the new technique's legality
has blocked its effective use. Moreover, the powerful inhibition resulting
from legal silence has been compounded by a general prognosis that the
ultimate verdict will be negative. This is because the actual substance of
marriage law is made of unsympathetic accretions from past centuries, and
because our legal system lacks positive techniques for making old law
adapt to scientific change. Clearly the ensuing struggle will be rife with
danger both for doctor and for patient until artificial insemination shall
have made its peace with the law.
The Scientific Process
Not until the 19th Century were the sciences clustered round the art of
medical treatment sufficiently freed from commercial casuistry to permit
the development of sound biology and scientific pathology. I And not until
the 20th Century did these new disciplines make serious investigation of the
facts of human sterility.7 The stimulus for investigation, although stem-
3. The social incentives to procreation are the same as those which lead men to live
in social groups and'they are particularly akin to those incentives which prompt ac-
cumulation of capital and property. Frustration of these incentives has throughout the
history of mankind been regarded as evil and curse. SUMNER AND KEaxn, I THP ScimrcE
OF SocmrE- § 11, IV THE ScmNcE OF SocIETY 406 (1927).
4. Nor have Anglo-American common, ecclesiastical or statutory laws concerned
themselves with alleviating the frustrations attending barren marriage. Although all
three would grant a divorce either amensa et thoro or a vinculo for "impotency," none
would dissolve that greater number of marriages barren by reason of "sterility" (lack of
procreative power). In fact courts have taken great pains *to construe statutes in terms of
this dichotomy although the language of the statute has often suggested a contrary
meaning. Williams v. Williams, 1 Tenn. Civ. App. (1 Higgins) 538 (1911), See also
Wilson v. Wilson, 126 Pa. Super. 423, 191 Atl. 666 (1937).
5. Approximately one marriage in every ten is barren and scientific studies indicate
that in 33-40% of the cases the cause of the childlessness may be due largely to some
deficiency in the reproductive powers of the husband. See Cone, Swvey of Present
Status and Problems of Sterility, 37 TExAs J. MED. 20 (1941) ; Stone, Fertility Sercries
in Planned Parenthood Programs, 10 HUMAN F TLiTY 9 (1945) ; Davis, Sterility Prob.
lem Today, 1 Am. P Acr. 1 (1946).
6. MALINOWSKr, INTRODUcIiON To HOGBINi, LAW AND ORDER IN POLYNESIA Ixvlli
(1934).
7. The 19th Century tended to view the question of sterility as a matter of con-
science rather than as a physical disorder. For example, little more than a life-time
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ming in part from protestations of the barren couples themselves, was and
continues in a large measure to be supplied by the anthropologist, sociol-
ogist and psychologist. Children are seen as a vital factor in American fam-
ily life. s Positive attitudes towards having children indicate an increased
probability of successful marital adjustment. 0 Marriages of five years and
over are as a general tendency happier where there are one or two children
than where there are no children. 10 And marital unions where children are
neither present nor desired rate on the average very low in marital happi-
ness. Il
Recognizing that more than one in ten married couples are involuntarily
barren, medicine has developed a pair of artificial inseminative techniques
as an ameliorative practice. Homologous insemination, or AIH, 12 is em-
ployed if either penile or vaginal malformation prevents fecundation in an
otherwise potentially fertile couple and entails the transfer of the husband's
own semen to the wife's reproductive tract. Although an artificial technique,
AIH excites no particular legal problems, since it is impossible to use unless
both husband and wife have consented, and since the resulting child is
actually their biological offspring. "3
ago (1869) the eminent Marion J. Sims was maligned by the Medical Times and Gazette
for his insistence on semen studies in the treatment of sterility. The Medical Times
charged that "this dabbling in the vagina with speculum and syringe is incompatible with
decency and self-respect."
It is only within the last forty years that American doctors have seriously bent them-
selves to the problem, and improved clinical techniques for aiding a barren couple are
hardly a quarter-century old in this country.
But see Clifford, Sterility Tests and Thir Morality, 107 Ecc-zsrAsnc,%M 1-v.
358-67 (1942).
S. BURGESS AND COTTRELL PRD IcrnG SUCCESS on FA n.un I MAnr.AGC 261 (1939).
9. Id. at 366.
10. LANG, STUDY oF RATINGS OF %L-nrAs.L I-,P nzss 49-50 (19.32).
11. BURGESS AND CorRE.L, op. cit. supra note 8, at 261. For a contrary opinion see
TnaSA, PSYcoLoOGIcAL FACT0oS ix MARrTAL HA.nmEss 172 (1938).
12. AIH, "artificial insemination homologous."
13. The legal innocuousness of AIH seems universally conceded, and all commentators
agree that the only area of legal complication would concern the dcctor, and that the rules
of conduct evolved in malpractice suits would seem to cover the situation. Malpractice
law simply requires that the practitioner shall have learning and sill commensurate wvith
that of physicians in good standing in the same locality, and that he use ordinary care
and diligence in the exercise of that learning and skill. E.g., Johnson v. Borland, 317
Mich. 225, 26 N.W. 2d 755 (1947).
It has been suggested, however, that the law might hold doctors administering AIH
to a higher degree of care since such practice is beyond the doctor's duty of presrving
the life and health of his patient. 34 VA. L. REv. 822, 823 (194S). But legal discrim-
ination seems meaningless unless it supposes that ordinary medicine unlike AIH involves
only the physical well-being of the patient. Such reasoning can find no comfort in cases
involving insanity and nervous disorders where the lack of physical malaise has not given
rise to legal differentiation.
For a comprehensive treatment of malpractice lax; see I-Ar Aim HAYI', LAw or
HosprrAr PHYsICIAN AND PATiENT (1947).
Of some interest, though, is a recent British case (New York Herald Tribune, De-
1949]
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The more frequently needed procedure, heterologous insemination or
AID, 14 is used when the wife is fertile and the husband is sterile or has
cacogenic hereditary characters. 11 This technique requires the artificial
transfer to the wife's reproductive tract of semen donated by a third person,
and the child is not biologically related to the husband. It is this biologic
disrelation of husband and child which threatens AID with the wrath of
the law. 16 To understand that threat one must appreciate the extent to
cember 1, 1948, p. 1, col. 3.) in which a court did manage to make a bastard out of a
child born via AIH. Artificial insemination did not directly provoke the result, Rather
the old saw that annulled marriages must be void ab initio took another child victim. Still
the AIH factor in the case did serve to dramatize the especial speciousness of this type
of conceptual jurisprudence since the annulment was given on grounds of impotency
in the husband. For discussion of the problems surrounding the doctrine of marriages
void ab initio, see 30 COL. L. REv. 877 (1930).
14. Although the name "AID" technically was formed by adding the initials of the
phrase "artificial insemination donor" reference to Freudian theories of symptomatic and
chance actions perhaps adds another significance to this happy collocation of letters.
15. Detailed articles on the physiological indications for use of artificial insemination
are legion in medical literature and seem generally to be in total agreement. See Israel,
Scope of Artificial Insemination in Barren Marriage, 202 Am. J. MED. Sci. 92 (1941) ;
Abel, note 1 supra; Guttmacher, Role of Artificial Insemination in Hunan Sterility, 19
BuLL. N. Y. AcAD. Mmn. 573 (1943) ; Halbrecht, Artificial Insemination: 80 Cases, 51 J.
OBSTmRICS AND GYNECOLOGY, Bar. EmP. 526 (1944); Barton, Walker, Wiesner, Artifi-
cial Insendination, 1945 VOL. I BRIT. Ma. J. 40; Davis, Sterility Problem Today, 1 Am.
PRAc. 1 (1946).
16. To date there have been but three adjudications with respect to artificial insemina-
tion on the North American continent. In two of these cases the allusion to artificial
insemination was pure dicta. Thus in Orford v. Orford, 49 Ont. L.R. 15 (1921) after
finding as a matter of fact that one Hodgkinson had had carnal relations in the ordinary
manner with the defendant and that this was sufficient cause to grant a divorce in the ac-
tion, the court felt constrained to consider heterologous artificial insemination even
though it was no longer material to the case. In this gratuitous portion of the opinion
the court declared AID to be adulterous.
-More recently an Illinois court, in another divorce action in which divorce was again
granted on the basis of adulterous sexual relations performed in the traditional physical
manner, declared in dicta that AID could never support a judgment that adultery had
been committed nor could it therefore support an action for divorce. See Hoch v. Hoch,
(not reported) (Chicago Sun, February 10, 1945.).
In the third and most recent case, Strnad v. Strnad, 78 N.Y.S. 2d 390 (1948), the
problem was at last the subject of a direct holding. In a divorce action the husband-de-
fendant seeking visitation rights defeated the theory of the plaintiff-mother that the child,
not being of the blood of the husband, could not stand in a parent-child relationship with
respect to the husband. The court ruling narrowly and only with respect to artificial
insemination and the right of visitation in divorce cases declared the child for this
purpose to stand in identically the same position as a natural born child.
Though artificial insemination's actual bouts with the law have thus far been few
and indecisive, the problem has not gone unnoticed in the journals. See WRIUT, SYMPO-
SIUU! ON MEDICOLEGAL PROBLEMS 43-87 (Levinson ed. 1948) Problems in Artificial
Insemination (editorial), 48 N. Y. STATE MEn. J. 600 (1948); Schatkin, Artificial In-
semination and Illegitimacy, 113 N. Y. L. J., 2432 (1945) ; Abel, stepra note 1; Editorial
on Artificial Insemination, 112 J. Am. MED. Assoc. 1832 (1939) ; Seymour and ICoerner,
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which the law of Christian marriage mirrors a cluster of outmoded usages in-
stead of the present in fact, habit, appreciation and belief.
Marriage, the Law, and AID
When women's sexual freedom is limited, the field of permissive sex action
becomes marriage, and its function is to handle human relationships which
exist as a consequence of human bisexuality. Marriage becomes a sort of
framework on which personal and group relations having to do with in-
dustry, property, war, government, and religion, when these have an element
of the sexual in them, are plotted and apportioned. 17
However, marriage, like other historical institutions, can develop with
neither too much of harmony nor logic. And from the Christian nuptial,
especially, an ancient formalism has taken its toll. On its arrangements,
long since grown rigid, are the marks of the medieval order: "marriage gave
support to a caste system resting on landed property, elevated the social
values of the family above the individual value of love, was blessed with the
ascetic idea of otherworldliness and became a sacrament." 19 These con-
ventions and values of medieval usage, once ossified in the lockstepping
dogma of church and law, have since responded but slowly to eight hun-
dred years of cultural change. Continued application of these outmoded
sanctions and trappings to modern circumstance is still, however, both
bane and purpose for lawyer and priest.
And medieval schematization metes cruel justice on an urban society
where "blood is no longer blue, life is impersonal, children are a luxury, and
women must earn their own livings." 19 Quondam answers to the problems
of property, social position-inheritance and succession-which automati-
cally came down the trunkline and branchings of blood kinship and the
restrictions which have formed as a sort of accretion along the same lines-
adultery, incest, illegitimacy-are clearly inadequate when applied to the
conditions of modern life and particularly when applied to AID.
And for courts who would write and rationalize their opinions, the prob-
lem is further aggravated by the fact that both the law and theology when
rearing a dialectic for feudal usage arranged their concepts with respect to
sex and procreation in pairs of polar opposites. The antipodal postures of
adultery-fidelity well illustrate this resistance to thinking in relative
Medicolegal Aspects of Artificial Insemination, 107 J. Ax. MED. Ass'.; 1531 (1935).
English comment is much the same as American, the legal problems being identical save
for the fact that the English are spared some of the conflict of laws confusion that our
federal system insures. See pp. 469-70 infra. For British comment see Martin, Artficial
Insemination, 34 NEw STATESMAN AND NATIO 7 (1947); Barton, Walker, Weisner,
note 15 supra; Forbes, Tle Mcdico-Legal Aspects of Artificial Insemination, 12 M0ico-
LEGAL AND CRIMINOLOGICAL REVIEW OF ENGLAND 138 (1944); Halbrect, Artificial In-
semination, 11 HUMAN FERTILI= 72 (1944).
17. SUMNER AND KELLER, Ta ScIENcE OF Soci-rv § 340 (1927).
18. Hamilton, Institutions, 8 ENcYa Soc. Scr. 84, 85 (1932).
19. Ibid.
1949]
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terms. 20 This made sense in a culture acknowledging but a single incident
as exception to the link twixt intercourse and progeny, and which saw its
whole authoritative scheme perturbed by infidelity's threat to descent, in-
heritance and succession. Thus the mores adjusting bisexuality evolved
into a marriage-institution whose heavenly ratified bonds could only be
burst by adultery. And when a marriage was broken, an intractible de-
ductive logic made the offspring of that adulterous mating filius nullius:
a being sans property or status.
The futility of applying these outmoded norms to AID probably shows
best in the fact that their use still leaves the result unpredictable. By taking
any approbative feudal concept for a major premise and AID's biologic
disrelation of the child and its mother's spouse for a minor, the law can ad-
vance to such implausible sequiturs as bastardy and adultery. Traditional
requirements of legitimacy cannot be met by the child not of the blood of its
mother's spouse-the child is therefore a bastard. Legitimacy requires con-
duct that cannot introduce a false strain of blood into the family of a hus-
band-the mother by AID must be an adultress.21 And courts questing for
dubious therefores can cut a wide swath. If AID is adulterous, marriage or
divorce may hang in the balance.22 Visitation rights or the duty of support
may depend on the finding of legitimacy. 23 The doctor can emerge a co-
conspirator to adultery, liable both criminally and in tort.24 A fee tail over
to issue can fall to or fail with the child born of AID. 25 Further hardship
20. For a discussion of the law's indifference to the distinction between "logical
division and natural classification" see Cohen, The Place of Logic in the Law, 29 HARV.
L. REv. 622 (1916).
21. For examples of courts and commentators convinced by or at least willing to
employ these syllogistic exercises, see Orford v. Orford, 49 Ont. L.R. 15 (1921) ; WRIuT,
op. cit. supra note 16; Schatkin, Artificial Insemination and Illegitimacy, 11 HuMAN
FmTaLmrr 14 (1946); Editorial, 112 J. Am. MED. Ass'x 1832 (1939).
22. The dicta in Orford v. Orford, 49 Ont. L.R. 15 (1921), shows the ease with which
that court would have rationalized a divorce.
Adultry is recognized as constituting a ground for divorce in nearly every state in the
union. Although in some jurisdictions a single act of adultery by the husband is not suffi-
cient to sustain a divorce, a single act by the wife will sustain such an action with hardly
any exception. 2 VERNIER, AuEmlcAN FAMILY LAWS § 65 (1932).
There are limitations on the granting of divorce for adultery, and these limitations
might be interpreted favorably to AID, e.g., where a husband's consent to his wife's
adultery vitiates adultery as a ground for divorce, Matchin v. Matchin, 6 Pa. 332 (1847);
where adultery must be accompanied by desertion, Steel v. Steel, 104 N. C. 631, 10 S, E. 707
(1889) ; or where condonation is a defense, Cumming v. Cumming, 135 Mass. 386 (1883).
Still such exceptions could easily be avoided by an antipathetic court's noting that the
limitations -were designed to meet other fact situations.
23. Strnad v. Strnad, 78 N. Y. S. 2d 390 (1948).
24. For the statement of a barrister willing to push this far see WaIGTn, Op. Cit. supra
note 16.
25. We have already experienced something akin to the problems AID can raise
in cases involving adoption. Courts in interpreting adoption statutes have gone both ways
with respect to such testate phrases as "issue of his body," "living issue," "issue," "chi-
dren," "legitimate children" or "descendant." Generally, however, an adopted child has
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may accrue from the ancient rule that a bastard has no intestate rights in
his father's estate. 2 And who is the father to claim the intestate estate of
the child?
But the products of casuistry are never inevitable. The law seems gra-
ciously receptive to AID when the judges compare artificial insemination
with the feudal norms of adultery instead of fidelity. For example, AID is
not literally included within any extant definition of adultery; therefore, it
can be reasoned that a woman who practices it cannot be an adulteress and
her offspring must be legitimateY This would follow inevitably if the law
would take its basic premise from sex crimes. Then adultery will require
intercourse which, as in the lay view, requires sexual penetration by an
adulterer measured by the realistic criteria of rape. 3 Since AID can no
more square with one set of traditional concepts than the other, selection of
not been allowed to take under a limitation "to the heirs of his body" although an adopted
child has been held to take under a limitation to the "lineal descendant" of the adopting
parent. See 4 VRnmn, AasmzcAN Fazmy LAws § 262 (1932) ; 38 I-Hnv. L. RLv. 976
(1924).
26. In accord with the English common law concept which regards the bastard child
as filius nullius every American jurisdiction save Connecticut at one time deemed the
bastard to be without inheritable blood. While most states have since enacted remedial
statutes, these invariably refer to the biologic father and in nearly every instance require
acts similar to those leading to legitimation as requisites for allowing rights of intestacy
to flow to the bastard.
27. One American court has used this rationale. HoEch v. Hcch (Chicago Sun,
February 10, 1945).
28. For cases illustrative of the general rule that penetration is an essential element
of rape, see Nider v. Commonwealth, 140 Ky. 64, 131 S. W. 1024 (1910) ; State v. Grubb,
55 Kan. 678, 41 P. 951 (1895).
Legal commentators on AID have been distressed by a sentence of Lord Dunedin in
the celebrated case of Russell v. Russell, 13 Brit. RUl. Cas. 246 (H. L App. Cas.) (1924).
Here it iwas said that fecundation ab extra is adultery. Id. at 279. At first blush this
generalization would seem to include AID. But study of the facts of the case and one of the
basic propositions which underlay Lord Dunedin's comment shows its pertinence to be
more apparent than real.
The case was a proceeding for divorce in consequence of adultery and the sole issue
at bar was whether a husband or wife is permitted to give evidence of nonintercourse after
marriage to bastardize a child born in wedlock. The peculiar factual aspect of the case
was that the appellant-wife had admittedly conceived and had a child without penetration
by any man; she wras fecundated ab extra. In order to get to the principal issue Lord
Dunedin said that for himself it mattered not that the corespondent's emission came at
the orifice and not within the vagina. An e'press postulate of the opinion was "that a
child cannot be conceived and born to a woman without previous intercourse with a man."
Id. at 278. That the justice was thinldng of intercourse and carnal Imowledge in its
traditional mode speaks for itself; that in such circumstances adultery should not depend
upon whether fecundation was a consequence of emission within or without the vagina
seems patent. It seems equally patent, however, that the case and the little gloss it puts
on traditional concepts of adultery can have no bearing on a fact situation where the entire
phenomenon of intercourse in its traditional sense is totally absent and where the policy
considerations facing a court are far and away different from those posed by the Russell
case.
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the initial term controls the result. That initial selection depends primarily
on whether the judge feels more moral indignation against the evils of
sterility than against the encroachment by science on the legal reserves of
family life.
Grace by Indirection
Some persons, either afraid or dismayed by the rewards of this fickle
logic, have sought and found hope in the law's occasional practice of restor-
ing with one hand that which it snatched with the other. It is true that both
statute and common law have long had a battery of techniques affecting a
return to grace from bastardy. However, none of the traditional methods-
registration of births, adoption, post hoc marriages or acknowledgment-
can rescue the participants in AID. These concepts, designed to achieve
desirable ends in fact situations other than those offered by AID, set re-
quirements appropriate to these other contexts but malapropos when ap-
plied to heterologous insemination.29
For legitimation of a bastard the law looks to the acts of the biologic
father. If he will marry the mother or acknowledge the child as his own,
legitimacy may be conferred.3" But with AID the biologic father is not the
proper parent. Moreover, he is usually unknown to the couple and child
and they to him. And this secrecy is dictated by important considerations,
For example, in some communities the novelty of the technique would mean
scandal or acute psychological pain for participants, and these very possi-
bilities are themselves invitations to blackmail. For the continued happi-
ness and security of donor, couple, doctor and child anonymity should be
preserved."1
Neither can adoption save AID. Here a technique in derogation of the
common law has long been burdened with requirements designed to insure
the welfare of indigent, homeless children, 2 and to meet these requirements,
even in the instances where they can be met, necessitates nearly total sacri-
fice of the secrecy that must surround successful practice of AID." For
29. For an ingenious discussion of how Pennsylvania adoption law might be used to
save the child born of AID see Schock, The Legal Stais of the Semi-Adopled, 46 Dicx.
L. REv. 271 (1942). See also 112 J. Am. MED. Ass'N 1832 (1939).
The court in Strnad v. Strnad, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1948), ran the gamut of saving
analogues. It speaks of the child as "semi-adopted," "potentially adopted" and somehow
was able to say "the situation is no different than that pertaining in the case of a child
born out of wedlock who by law is made legitimate upon the marriage of the interested
parties."
30. MADDEN, PERSONS AND) DOMEsTIc RELATIONS, 344-7 (1931).
31. Commentators on AID seem unanimously agreed on this point. See Guttmacher,
Role of Artificial Insemination in the Treatment of Sterlity, 120 J. Am. MED. Ass'X
442, 445 (1942) ; Barton, Walker, Wiesner, supra note 15, at 41.
32. Kuhlmann, Intestate Succession By and From the Adopted Child, 28 WASu1.
U. L. Q. 221, 224 (1943).
33. For a discussion of the myriad problems certain to face a couple and child seeking
legal sanctuary via adoption, see Schock, supra note 29.
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example, when the adopting parent or parents petition the orphan's court,
they must state the name of the child to be adopted. Since the surnames of
children are patronymics in our culture, this sets a requirement incompati-
ble with AID whose donor must remain anonymous.
The same problem arises again when the names of the natural parents of
the child are requested. In cases where the doctor has kept records these
facts could doubtless be determined. However, the consequence of such
disclosure would be the elimination of the practice since neither donors nor
couples can be psychologically prepared for such an event. A similar name
problem arises with respect to the birth certificate. Most states require that
both the obstetrician and the parents shall attest to registration statements
of parenthood. 'Where the doctor knows the child to have been born via
AID, he must either swear falsely or sacrifice crucial secrecy. And of course
the couple is always forced to face this false swearing dilemma.
A Substitute Law
When the courts and legislators and other agencies regularly charged with
maintaining social order failed to deal satisfactorily with AID, the medical
profession was forced to improvise in a foreign field. Faced with a legal
attitude towards artificial insemination varying from opposition to disre-
gard, the doctors have evolved a body of "ground rules" in an attempt to
police the practice and to obtain a degree of self-protection. Rightly noting
that the crux of every question that turns on AID is the status of the child
or would-be-child with respect to its mother's husband, institutional pat-
terns and ground rules have been developed to attest and bind the mother
and husband and child as a family.
For secrecy, if the doctor who inseminates the mother does not care to
swear falsely with respect to the husband's paternity, the ground rules
categorically advise him to send the couple elsewhere at birth that his
brother in ignorance may innocently swear to the false.34
Professional opinion divides sharply, though, on the better way to hold
the donor, the couple and the child to their proper spheres. One group would
use complex, signed, sealed, and fingerprinted bilateral agreements attesting
consent to the practice and defining each signator's orbit. Others would
avoid records entirely, premising security on the legal presumption favoring
legitimacy, the physician client privilege, and donor and couple selection
designed to avoid the litigiousG
Participants in AID have been advised to draw wills in order to avoid the
34. Abel, note 1 supra.
35. Seymour and Koerner, note 16 supra.
36. Guttmacher, Physicians' Credo for Artificial Inso inalion, 50 NrsT. J. Sur="
357 (1942); Guttmacher, Role of Artificial Inseyninatlion, satra note 31, at 445. Dr.
Guttmacher takes a rather Olympian view of his relationship to the patient and the law.
He admonishes a doctor to regard himself as an "Aesculapian" administering to "some
wretched, worthy, sterile couple."
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pitfalls of intestacy. And clauses have been suggested that would withdraw
the share of any who attack on the basis of AID.
37
But while they have tilted with the existing law, the doctors have also
looked to broader social goals than is commonly the legal wont. Medicine
has included in its ground rules provisions capable of producing eugenically
superior children in better homes than is true in most instances where the
child is biologically related to its mother's spouse."
In AID these objectives are achieved by means of a simple operating code
which requires that couples showing the biologic indications for heterologous
insemination must demonstrate, prior to resort to AID, average or better
than average intelligence, 9 marital and emotional stability,40 and absence
of serious dysgenic characters in the female.4 1 The couple must also show
reasonable financial ability to care for a child,42 and most important, both
spouses must sincerely want to attempt AID.
43
Professional concern for the broader eugenic and social aspects is further
reflected in the factors which govern donor selection. Here the donor must
be physically healthy, have no dysgenic hereditary traits, have a high sper-
matozoa count and motility index, and resemble the male spouse in racial,
37. Seymour and Koerner, note 16 supra.
38. That this has been generally accomplished is reflected in a variety of ways.
Neither before nor since Seymour and Koerner published their study of 10,000 cases of
babies born via artificial insemination (Artificial Insemination Present Status in the
United States, 116 J. Am. MED. Ass'x 2747 (1941)) has an instance of a biologically
inferior child born via the technique been reported.
Some measure of family balance is attested by the paucity of law suits involving the
practice. Only three cases, involving artificial insemination, each for divorce have yet
arisen in the English speaking world. See note 16 spra. And in each of these instances
it may fairly be said that artificial insemination was more a whipping boy for, than the
cause of, the divorce.
A variety of reports indicate the generally superior home conditions which medical
screening provides children born via artificial insemination. See Halbrecht, note 15
supra; Folsome, The Status of Artificial Insemination, 45 Am. J. OnsrMnucs AND GyNr-
coLoGY, 915 (1943). This latter article also contains trenchant criticism of Seymour's
and Koerner's 1941 study, supra note 16, at 917-22.
39. Drs. Seymour and Koerner require a Stanford-Binet I.Q. of 120 in couples ap-
plying for artificial insemination. Interview, April 13, 1948. All other commentators
have indicated concern for the intelligence of the couple although Barton, Walker and
Wiesner have rejected the idea of artificial insemination being employed to produce a race
of "supermen." Barton, Walker, Wiesner, note 15 sn/ra.
40. See Seymour and Koerner, note 16 supra; Weisman, Selection of Donors for
Use in Artificial Insemination, 50 WST. J. SuRGERT 142 (1942); Guttmacher, note 1
supra.
41. Ibid.
42. Drs. Seymour and Koerner make a point of looking into the matter of financial
status. Interview, note 39 supra. But even though other writers have not expressly
mentioned it, the fact may well be concealed within their more euphonic phrases of
"marital adjustment," and "social integration."




physical, and emotional setup.44 Married men with children are preferred.
The children provide a test of physiological factors and a focus for the
donor's parental affection. 4" And finally the profession has been placed on
guard against donor and doctor fees likely to make cost a prohibitive fac-
tor.s
Despite this complex of regulation, the law remains a persistent hazard
to the doctors' attempts to save couples, donors, children and themselves
from the realit, of severe social and legal complications. Detailed analysis
of the problems involved suggests that legislative decision is the only ulti-
mate solution47 The status of all the parties must be reviewed and made
official; and if the related genetics and financial considerations are to be left
in the shadowland of professional rule, this lacuna should be the product of
purpose and not of default.
The Problems of Legislation
But as it now stands a legislator who would write specific provisions into
a law on AID must look for guidance to little more than his own select
prejudice. For all the questions of AID must turn on specific answers-on
information from the anthropologist, biologist, psychologist, sociologist
et cetera. And the answers of these men, where extant, are in fact not avail-
able to law-givers for want of a system of liaison with the social sciences.
For example, there is the basic question of whether AID should be in-
hibited-inhibited in terms of the persons who may practice it and the
technicians who may administer it. Should unmarried women be prevented
from having children by this technique? Here the psychologist and sociol-
ogist must attempt to evaluate such factors as raising a child in the absence
of a male parent, the stigma on a child known to be a product of the new
scientific technique, the probability of societal acceptance of that technique,
the effect of AID on marriages, the real increase in happiness it will bring
to unmarried women. -1 Before permitting the practice even to married
couples desiring to attempt AID these same specialists should have gauged
whether the likely effect on the marriage and child would be so detrimental
as to argue proscription of the procedure. And where only one member of a
marital pair agrees to the practice, to the above problems would be added
a variety of additional issues, some closely akin to those present when a
44. Weisman, note 40 supra.
45. Barton, Walker, Wiesner, note 15 supra.
46. Guttmacher, Physicians' Credo, note 36 supra.
47. Both medical and legal commentators have reached this conclusion before. See
Tucker, Legal Problems of Artificial Inscmination, 33 Wo a L.wvms' J. 57 (1947) ;
Koerner, Medicolegal Considerations in Artificial Inscinination, 8 LA. L. Rnv. 4S4 (1948).
48. There is the alternative of treating this problem as tx,.enty states are content to
treat the problems of miscegenation, i.e., as a matter of parental, personal choice. The
California Supreme Court expressly chose this course vth respect to miscegenation
in Perez v. Lippold, 32 A. C. 757 (Cal. 1948). See Note, Constitutionality of Anti-nis-
cegenation Statutes, infra p. 472.
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child is born to a couple one spouse of which had insisted on the use of
contraceptives. 41
The law-giver would have to look to the criminologist for precise infor-
mation on optimum enforcement techniques if the practice is to be adminis-
tered by only a limited group of technicians. Will the simplicity and safety
of the practice require novel methods for preventing nurses, veterinarians,
druggists and even laymen from administering? And if administration is
not to be limited, can controls of any nature be effective? Certainly the
parties to AID should expect legal craftsmen to protect them with eviden-
tiary regulations, recording devices and procedural safeguards whenever
they have acted in compliance with societal consent.
A certain source of litigation with respect to AID might readily be fore-
closed by legislation detailing the incidents of intestate succession. But
should the social attitude of such legislation be to effect a complete inte-
gration of the AID child within a family pattern identical to that accorded
to children related to each of the spouses? 11 Would it be too serious an
abuse of our concepts of property and its transmission down a bloodline to
permit the fact of AID birth to remain totally secret with respect to in-
heritance from collateral relatives? An investigation of current folklore and
mores by the anthropologist and sociologist could sensibly determine the
cost of permitting a child born of AID to inherit through the lineal and
collateral relatives of his mother and her spouse.
To the biologist, sociologist and anthropologist falls the problem of de-
termining the possible consequences of alternative schemes for eugenics
control. The questions involved here range from the simple query-can
eugenics produce better children?-to more subtle societal interests-what
would be the effect on marriages and normal children of the presence of an
aristocracy of "better AID products"? And the lawyer must add to the
above studies his estimate of how enactment of minimal IQ, racial, and
physical demands for couple selection will relate to constitutional strictures
against discrimination. 51
49. The pioneering regulation of the medical profession insists that both spouses
agree to artificial insemination. The doctors have argued that there was a positive like-
lihood of producing genuinely unhappy marriages and unhappy home environments for
children unless mutual consent was obtained. See note 43 supra.
For a discussion of the somewhat similar problems incident to the use of contracep-
tives see, Contraceptives and Divorce Law, 95 L. J. 249 (1945).
50. This is the intestate scheme that is felt to be proper in the case of adoption.
For a discussion of the considerations which dictate such a plan see Kuhlmann, note 32
supra.
51. While sterilization laws have generally been upheld as constitutional-Buck v,
Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), settled the federal constitutional question-it seems very prob-
able that considerations designed not so much to avoid generations of morons as to provide
generations of super-children by discriminating against people merely because they are
average or slightly sub-average might fail. The delegation of so broad an authority to
private doctors alone might condemn it.
For a complete summary through 1940 of the sterilization statutes and court decisions
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While enactment of model legislation is urgently needed now, the likli-
hood of diversity among the statutes, if the several states are left to treat the
issue, creates questions in the conflict of laws.
Commentators on conflicts have tended to mininize the power of a forum
to refuse enforcement of a right acquired under the law of another state.
Nonetheless, such a power exists and will in some instances override comity
if a court feels that the nature of a foreign right contravenes the public
policy of the state where enforcement is sought. The tests here only require
that a court regard the right as "inherently vicious, wicked, or immoral"
or one which, if judicially enforced, would present its people a "pernicious
and detestable" example. 52 For questions of sex and medicine these are
procrustean rules. It therefore seems likely that parties depending on rights
acquired in states sympathetic to AID should anticipate difficulty enforc-
ing these rights in states opposed to the practice.
The question of domicile in conflict of laws also invites use of those
traditional and here inappropriate legal norms of legitimacy and bastardy.
In conflicts, domicile for the legitimate child is considered to be that of the
biologic or adoptive father 5 3 and for the bastard to be that of the mother.5"
Resolution of this point in a case will easily, in the absence of legislation,
force courts back into their bramblebush of obsolete referents to marriage
and procreation. 1-
To deal effectively with any of these technical conflicts problems which
our federal system insures we must return to the social scientist for answers
to the real questions involved. For example, is the relationship of the in-
dividual to the various levels of existing government so subtle that the
democratic process will not permit immediate moral issues to be decided
nationally? And if moral decisions are better controlled by smaller political
thereon see, Hughes, Eugenic Sterilization it the United States, SUPP. No. 16, Punmac
HEALTa REPoRTs (1940).
52. Veytia v. Alvarez, 30 Ariz. 316, 247 Pac. 117 (1926); Loucks v. Standard Oil
Co. of New York, 224 N. Y. 99, 120 N. E. 19S (1918).
53. Delaware, L. & W.R.R. v. Petrowsky, 250 Fed. 554 (2d Cir. 191S); Bjornquist
v. Boston & A. R. Co., 250 Fed. 929 (1st Cir. 1918) ; Kennedy v. Ryall, 67 N. Y. 379 (1876).
See RE:STATEmENrT, CONFLicT OF LAWS § 30 (1934).
54. Danbury v. New Haven, 5 Conn. 584 (18-5); Glansman v. Ledbetter, 190 Ind.
505, 130 N. E. 230 (1921) ; Thayer v. Thayer, 187 N. C. 573, 122 S. E. 307 (1924). See
RESTATFMNT, CONFUCr OF LAWs § 34 (1934).
55. Another conflicts problem, one common to adoption, will doubtless arise in cases
turning on AID. That is, are intestacy rights a part of the adoptive status and therefore
controlled by the state of adoption, or are they merely incidental to the adoption status?
The majority rule holds that the full faith and credit clause only requires that a court
recognize the adoption status of a child adopted in another state; the Constitution doe
not compel one state to recognize the law of another with respect to the effect of adop-
tion on the scheme of intestate succession. The courts -%ill very likely apply this rule to
AID cases since the rationale that inheritance provisions are only an incidental feature
of the law of adoption seems equally applicable to artificial insemination. See Kuhlmann,
note 32 supra.
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units, how can we adjust provincial or parochial rules to accommodate the
high degree of mobility and interdependency of the modern industrial
state?
CONCLUSION
And so AID comes to typify a broader problem for church and court
and legislating men. It is a case study in the technique of change. For even
after growth and innovation are no longer branded as undesirable, there
remains the task of formally and gracefully accommodating them within
a culture. 11 Historically the role of the law in this process has been simple-
the pin pricks of an infinity of special instances gradually tatoo a pattern
of acceptance for the onetime novel or bold.
And the law's response to the challenge of AID has been to follow this
familiar methodology. For centuries a human want existed-escape from
biologically imposed childlessness. Through the careful and intensive inves-
tigatory techniques which characterize the physical sciences, medicine made
great strides in coping with the matter, after which it offered its dis-
coveries to society. From normal human frictions came litigation, and a
handful of cases have been thrust before an unprepared judiciary. A group
of different legal doctrines and varying rules designed with a view toward
other issues and other ages have been intuitively reworked in a makeshift
attempt to meet a current need. Though the problem must clearly be met,
when as many as 4,000 AID children are presently alive in America, 11 only
two legislatures seem to have recognized the existence of AID, and here the
bills, hastily conceived with no adequate supporting study, have died in
committee. 68
56. But the immature will defend against change, as a source of insecurity and anxiety.
For an excellent example of such a defense in the field of legal thinking see Note, 34 VA.
L. REv. 822 (1948). Opposing change as an evil, this writer argued against the innovation
of heterologous artificial insemination "because [AID] is entirely unnecessary . . . .be-
cause it is contrary to accepted standards of legitimacy and adultery." Id. at 824. But the
most extreme example of his felt need for a static legal system was his argument that AID
should be discouraged because it was "legally problematical," likely to be productive of -un-
certain legal consequences. Id. at 827. It would seem impossible under this test for change
ever to come to that cluster of immutable concepts which the author had confused with the
law.
57. This estimate is based on Seymour's and Koerner's report of 3649 AID cases
extant in 1941. See Seymour and Koerner, note 38 slupra,
58. New York Sen. 745 (1948)
"A child born to a married woman by means of artificial insemination with the ex-
press or implied consent of her husband shall be deemed the legitimate, natural child of
both the husband and his wife for all purposes, and such husband and wife and such child
shall sustain toward each other the legal relations of parent and child and shall have
all the rights and be subject to all the duties of that relationship including the rights of
inheritance from each other."
Virginia Sen. 745 (1948)
"Children born as the result of artificial insemination.-Children born as the result
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The agencies concerned are not acting to enquire into the nature of their
subject nor the ramifications of their acts. At no point in the structure of
our lawgiving machinery are facilities available to study the complex in-
dividual and institutional aspects of the question. In law we demand
precision in analysis, niceness of thought, and certainty of effect in inverse
relation to the social complexity and import of the problem involved. The
agencies of social regulation and their rubric, the law, still operate with a
casualness unknown in small business and a carelessness impossible in any
larger commercial enterprise.
At the outset it is necessary to establish a system for appraising the opera-
tion of our legal institutions-for reporting regularly on their success or
failure in terms of the objectives they are designed to achieve. Given
adequate financial support, the institutions of legal education, the bar
associations and the existing organizations devoted to the social sciences,
working in close liaison with the technical sciences would be able to ascertain
the areas in which social change is occurring without corresponding legal
adjustment. Socio-legal developments such as AID having been spotted, a
detailed scientific, legal, and sociological study should be made, Brandeis
briefs prepared, and model legislation drafted where needed. In the absence
of or perhaps supplemental to such studies by private institutions, legis-
lative action in the nature of the TNEC investigations has been shown to
be eminently feasible in providing a factual basis for rational decision on
issues of social control. It is to be hoped that the immediate problem of AID,
and the haphazard legal treatment it has received will be seen as illustrative
of the need for creating some system for measuring the effectiveness of our
social regulation and for better adjusting it to the phenomenon of change.
of artificial insemination shall be considered the same as legitimate children for all pur-
poses, if the husband of the mother consented to the operation."
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